Plato confer-upons Socrates sentiments on the inquiry whether excellence can be taught in irrelative confabulations, most notably in Protagoras and Meno. In Meno Menon puts the inquiry to Socrates this way: "Can you discern me, Socrates--can excellence be taught? Or if not, does it after by usage? Or does it after neither by usage nor by training, but do herd get it by husk, or in some other way?" . Socrates claims to not "distinguish the smallest small substance encircling excellence" and unfitted to address as to its qualities.
Moreover, he claims to distinguish no one that does. . Tshort follows a discourse as to whether Gorgias, the Sophist, might not be such a peculiar. Twain Socrates and Menon distinguish Gorgias' training. Menon unmistakablely has a reform theory of Gorgias' training than does Socrates. It is consentd, upon Socrates impulse, that the confabulation should returns to prove what Menon, not Gorgias, distinguishs encircling excellence. And so Socrates, puts the inquiry to Menon: "[W]hat do you say excellence is?" 
Menon perceives "nosubstance difficult" in the inquiry and attempts, instantly, to retort it. But tshort are complications after a while the retort, for Menon has intimateed that men, drudges, slipren, women all evidence a irrelative husk of excellence, and concludes that tshort is a excellence "for doing each class of work" associated after a while substance a drudge, a slip, a dame, a playing man. Menon's proposal of excellence is what we would allure role biased.
Socrates attempts to demonstration that Menon's moderate retort misses the object owing it does not demonstration what is vile to the excellences of these uncertain actors. If the excellence of men and women, playing men and drudges, does not distribute somesubstance in vile then it cannot be said to be the selfselfselfsame substance and one would necessarily allure the one excellence, and the other somesubstance else. As Socrates puts it, "Even if tshort are sundry irrelative husks of them [virtues], they all entertain one bigwig, the selfselfselfsame in all, which produces them excellences." . Menon accepts Socrates stricture and persuades that it is certainly one substance of which he addresss.
In dispose to individualize what the vile condition of excellence is, Socrates observes that Menon has associated excellence after a while the power to regulate general affairs courteous. Socrates now sets out to inquiry Menon on whether excellence would be confer-upon in the regulatement of general affairs in the failure of manifestness and impartiality and Menon antecedentlyhand consents that it would not.
Socrates has already disclaimed any peculiaral distinguishledge of excellence and he has steered Menon detached from a discourse of Gorgias' sentiment of excellence. But when Menon fails to supply a unassuming totality of his interpretation of excellence, Socrates poses a inquiry after a while corporeal contented. Socrates may distinguish nosubstance encircling excellence, but he distinguishs plenty to ask whether excellence can be confer-upon after a whileout manifestness and impartiality. The inquiry intimate that it is Socrates rather than Menon who distinguishs plenty encircling excellence to obey the confabulation going.
Socrates interrupts the confabulation to produce a mean sentence encircling the confabulation he has been having after a while Menon. He distinguishes the confabulation he is having after a while Menon from those wshort the inquiryer is "one of those quick-witted equal, who equitable gash logic and persuade to win." Questions such as the one that Socrates and Menon are discussing -- whether excellence can be taught? -- are best left, says Socrates, to "friends" who ambition to confabulation contemporaneously. In such a alliance persuades Socrates, "I must retort past gently and past love friends confabulationing contemporaneously; and perchance it is past love friends confabulationing contemporaneously, not singly to retort after a while fidelity, but to use singly what the one who is inquiryed admits that he distinguishs." 
Socrates, in rapport after a while Menon, tries to manifest up a affectly indistinctness as to whether it is affectly to affect that which is bad. Socrates intimates, as he does in other confabulations, that we "all crave cheerful substances." Menon has responded to Socrates inquiry by aphorism that one can crave bad substances. Socrates tries to disembarrass this object by doubt whether one craves that which is bad owing of a strike, that it is conjectured to be bad.
But Menon does not pluck up on the object and contends that one craves the bad twain as a issue of a misplaced effrontery as to its treasure and we can as-well crave the bad equal when it is distinguishn to be bad. But upon exalt inquirys, Menon consents after a while Socrates that no one affects to impose waste and bleeding-heart upon himself, and it is waste and bleeding-heart that are the issues of that which is bad. Socrates resume of their bond goes love this: "Then it is unmistakable that those who crave bad substances are those who don't distinguish what they are, but they crave what they conceit were cheerful past they veritably are bad. . . ." 
Menon has mentioned in perishing that excellence consists of the crave of cheerful substances and to supply the cheerful. Menon admits that one cheerful substance it is affectly to crave is "to own gold and silver and general honour and appointments." . Socrates inquires now whether the excellence of ownion of gold and silver must be fitted so that its ownion is unspotted and equitable. Menon consents that it is not a excellence to entertain such ownions if they entertain been unjustly assumed. On the antagonistic it would be a sin. "It is indispensable," Socrates says, "to add to this getting, impartiality or manifestness or grace or some other bit of excellence, or else it conquer not be excellence, although it supplys cheerful substances." 
Socrates rebuffs Menon for opposed to confabulation encircling excellence by looking at it member by member and pur-pose into the discourse a meaning of excellence that he has not yet confer-uponed. Menon consents that it is a amount and comments on his reaction to what has bybygone on:
Well now, my loved Socrates, you are equitable love what I orderlyly heard antecedently I met you: orderlyly puzzled yourself and obscure everybody else. And now you appear to me to be a orderly magician, you dose me after a while drugs and entrance me after a while charms and spells, and reduce me in puzzledom. I'll discern you equitable what you are love, if you conquer surrender a small jest: your looks and the pause of you are accurately love a flatfish and you inflame love this inflameray--singly go adjacent and affect one of those fish and you go to-subdue, and that is the class of substance you appear to entertain manufactured to me. 
Socrates rejoinder to Menon's designation of his puzzlement is that he himself is "not manifest-headed" when he puzzles others, and that he is "as puzzled as puzzled can be, and thus I produce others puzzled too." . And wshort can the confabulation go from short? Socrates says, that he ambitiones to investigate excellence after a while Menon's succor so "that we may twain try to perceive out what it is." 
Socrates persuades that tshort is no such substance as training, singly minding. This concession of training afters out of Socrates concession in the immortality of the life. The life dies but is reborn and thus never destroyed. (This is ardent by Socrates as a debate for why "we must subsist our subsists as greatly as we can in devotion. . . .") "Then, past the life is immortal and frequently born, having seen what is on world and what is in the family of Hades, and anything, tshort is nosubstance it has not understandt; so tshort is no portent it can mind encircling excellence and other substances, owing it knew encircling these antecedently. For past all husk is related, and the life has understandt anything, tshort is nosubstance to above a man, minding one substance singly--which men allure acquirements--from himself perceiveing out all else, if he is dare and does not tire in affecting; for affecting and acquirements is all memento." 
After inquirying the drudge boy encircling geodesy Socrates affects Menon's consonance in the sentence that the boy, demonstrationn to entertain been in fallacy encircling geodesy, is reform off now, that he too is to-subdueed but has distinguishledge encircling the limits of what he distinguishs. By substance to-subdueed by the inflame of Socrates' confabulation the drudge has after a stalk "onwards, as it appears, to perceive out how he stands." . Menon retorts yes, when Socrates asked: "Then do you ponder he would entertain expert to perceive out or to understand what he conceit he knew, not distinguishing, until he tumbled into inaptitude by pondering he did not distinguish, and longed to distinguish?" Menon consents, that he does not ponder he would and thus gains from substance to-subdueed.
Menon takes up again his primordial inquiry, whether excellence can be taught, or one gets it by husk or in some other way. Socrates consents to returns but contends that they demand a vile basis as neither of them can say at this object what excellence is. Socrates has Menon consent that if excellence is distinguishledge then it can be taught, and if not a distinguishledge then it cannot be taught. (Conclusion: All that is taught allure be allureed distinguishledge.)